The Ottawa Treaty: A Mistake in Modern Warfare?

By Eitan Godsi 

As the war in Ukraine rages on, it is the responsibility of any sensible defence policy to account for the developments in modern conventional warfare. Of the concerns raised in thousands of videos, testimonials, and accounts, one issue has been almost completely ignored.  

When Ukrainian troops training in Germany asked their instructors about what to do when approaching minefields, the response was almost comical- just go around them [1]. This statement is not what should be expected from the NATO member given a leading role in a NATO task force in 2019 [2]. Unfortunately, this approach is reflective of the broader cataclysmic shift in defence policy after the cold war. 

Nothing is more emblematic of the negligence in defence policy since the cold war than the Ottawa Treaty. Frankly, the initial reasoning for this treaty was dubious enough- the Soviet Union and similar reckless states being irresponsible and failing to properly document minefields in Afghanistan and other areas of conflict was a key catalyser, alongside exaggerated claims from non-governmental organisations (NGO) [3]. 

 One figure claiming of 10 million mines planted by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (down from a previous claim of 35 million) implies they somehow put down 3,000 mines every single day over 9 years, a ridiculous suggestion [3]. 

 In essence, because autocratic irresponsible states have misused conventional weaponry, Western institutions and NGOs led an initiative to ban it, despite the clear fact those same authoritarian states would ignore a ban. In a furore of ecstasy, peace was the order of the day.  

It was nothing short of a monumentally stupid moralistic declaration, banning an effective, cheap and conventional weapon which is the most effective tool for a numerically smaller or ill-equipped force to establish a defensive perimeter.  

The use in Ukraine has been extensive, but the strongest case for the dissolution of Ottawa comes from former Chief of Staff General Zaluzhnyi. In a landmark paper, he describes mine barriers with a density of ‘15-20km’, and the development of ‘reconnaissance and fire complexes’ [4].  

This is an excellent demonstration of the fusion of past and present in modern conventional war. Deep minefields are covered with UAV reconnaissance, detecting any incursion, and directing fire upon it, before equipment like the Zemledeliye remote mine laying system immediately replenishes the minefield.  

NATO has been reluctant to accept the reality that conventional warfare has returned to Europe, but now that it has, we must ask the tough questions. What good will the Zeitenwende be should NATO ever encounter such a reconnaissance and fire Complex? The NATO Force Model will do little good if combined arms manoeuvres are limited by vast minefields with Russian ISR directing artillery, preventing armour from effectively supporting infantry [5].  

When deployed, would those same German instructors maintain such simple advice in the face of brutal reality? 

Russian conventional forces could match the area denial from NATO air superiority on land, thereby preventing or limiting the area of operations or an axis of advance for NATO conventional forces and allowing them to fortify gains, whilst any Western conventional advance would have no such advantage.  

Indeed, NATO forces could be funnelled into kill zones avoiding deep minefields they had no training breaching. Moreover, the Zemledeliye proved highly effective at limiting the breakthrough following the 2023 counteroffensive by Ukraine [6].  

The M58 mine clearing line charge demonstrates such defences are not insurmountable, but European land forces are burdened with equipment shortages and have a severe deficiency in anti-mining capability [7]. It would be simple to mass produce mines, at the very least to establish similar fire complexes, and perhaps more crucially to leverage the NATO advantage in ISR by blocking likely routes of advance. 

As ever, we should follow the examples of those on the coalface to take instruction on dealing with Russia. In Finland, which shares an 830mile border with Russia, three of the four opposition parties have pushed to withdraw [8]. A bill went to the Estonian parliament, which faces a 338-mile border with Russia, but was rejected.  

These calls may be small, but the salience of this issue has continued to rise. Perhaps it was the Finnish Minister of defence who put it best in 2018, years before the pressure building since the Russian invasion, describing the treaty as a ‘A blunder by a peacetime fool’ [9].  

Indeed, both a former Chief of Defence and ex-Chairman of the EU Military Committee, alongside a former Director General of strategic weapons and strategy development at the Finnish MOD have come out against the treaty [10]. Perhaps most critically, Alexander Stubb, who won the 2024 presidential election, has previously supported withdrawal.  

Of course, landmines should be used responsibly, and a requirement to clearly document minefields should absolutely be a prerequisite for use. But an outright ban gives the authoritarian states challenging the liberal world order a critical advantage that could well negate superiority of equipment and training in Western Conventional forces. We should strive to avoid war, but only effective force can deter our adversaries.  

The rot in European defence policy which has so emboldened Russia will clearly take time to fix, but we need cheap, cost-effective solutions now. Europe now faces an evolving strategic challenge with the US having competing priorities in Europe and Asia, and the dangerous prospect of Trump undermining NATO.  

The era of boundless peace is over, and to ignore this only encourages aggression and fails to project deterrence.  

Landmines are extremely cost effective, providing an immediate wider arsenal that would have a profound defensive potential in defending Europe, whilst it takes time for a more comprehensive defence posture to develop. When War in Europe has broken out for the first time in 75 years, and Russian Tanks once more roll west in an open challenge to democracy and freedom, it is time for NATO to bury the relics of the peace dividend and abandon the albatross of Ottawa. 

Sources:

[1] “Just Drive around the Minefields: What German Instructors Trained Ukrainians on Leopard 2 | Defense Express.” 2020. 

[2] NATO. 2019. “Germany Steps up to Lead NATO High Readiness Force.” NATO. 2019. 

[3] Rutherford, Kenneth, THE EVOLVING ARMS CONTROL AGENDA, Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines, 2000. 

[4] Zaluzhnyi, Valerii, Modern Positional Warfare and How to win it, 2023. 

[5] New NATO Force Model, 2022, NATO 

[6] Kofman, Michael, “Assessing Russian Military Adaptation in 2023.” 2023. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2023. 

[7] “​How Ukrainians Deal with Russian ‘Wagner’s Line’ of Defense with Concrete ‘Teeth’ | Defense Express.” 2020. Defence-Ua.com. 2020. 

[8] “Debate over Ottawa Treaty Resurfaces in Finland amid Russian Aggression | Wilson Center.” n.d. 

[9] Aleksi Teivainen. 2018. “Joining Ottawa Treaty Was ‘a Blunder by a Peacetime Fool,’ Says Minister of Defence.” Helsinki Times. July 17, 2018.  

[10] Vaalisto, Heidi, Was the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines a mistake for Finland? “We were left with a black peck”, Ilta-Sanomat, 2022.